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Introduction 
In recent years there has been considerable debate about the policy relevance of efforts to move 
‘beyond behaviour change’ and develop strategies inspired by an understanding of how social 
practices emerge, persist, develop and disappear (Shove 2010; Shove & Spurling 2013; Spurling, 
McMeekin et al. 2013). When viewed as a type of social theory, theories of practice have a 
number of distinctive features, the most obvious of which is that they take the lives and 
trajectories of social practices as the central unit of analysis and enquiry. This basic move 
establishes the ground for further investigations into, for instance, the ‘elements’ of which 
practices are composed, their material anchoring, their history, their relation to other practices, 
and related processes of erosion, accumulation, recruitment and defection. In terms of academic 
debate and understanding, it is not too difficult to see what practice theories have to offer, or to 
show how they draw from and relate to other theoretical traditions (Reckwitz 2002; Shove, 
Pantzar et al. 2012; Nicolini 2013). 
It appears to be rather harder to explain what practice theories might contribute to policy making 
in general, or to climate change policy in particular. There are various possible interpretations. At 
one extreme, it would be possible to argue that so much of contemporary policy making, across so 
many fields and countries, is so thoroughly imbued with behavioural and economic models and 
related understandings of choice and change that theories of practice are simply 
incommensurable. As such they have no place at all in policy making, at least not as it is currently 
configured. By implication, practice theories could be of enormous value to policy, but only if 
policy ambitions, strategies and methods were to take practices as the topic and target of 
intervention. Chatterton (2011) takes a different approach, arguing that social practice theory 
represents a useful addition to the repertoire of behavioural and economic options available to 
policy makers, extending the list of strategies from which to pick and mix. Meanwhile, others, such 
as Jackson (2005), suggest that the main effect is to enhance existing models, reminding analysts 
to put somewhat greater emphasis on ‘social norms’ as behavioural drivers. As these comments 
indicate, there are significant differences of opinion about what a theoretical focus on practices 
entails, and about the compatibility or otherwise of rival paradigms (Shove 2011; Whitmarsh, 
O’Neill et al. 2011). 
One common feature is that discussions of the policy relevance of practice theory are routinely 
framed with reference to already established methods of conceptualising and responding to the 
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problem of persuading people to adopt lower carbon solutions. Given the title of this chapter, 
‘linking low carbon policy and social practice’, readers might well expect a text that contributes to 
this literature and that demonstrates the benefits of taking social practice rather than individual 
behaviour as the topic of policy intervention and analysis. Sure enough, the editors of this book 
described the task ahead in just these terms, and invited me and other contributors to consider 
the following questions: 
 Can we intervene in, or govern, social life from a social practice theoretical perspective 
(rather than behavioural or other perspectives)? 
 How do/can we intervene in, or govern, social life from a social practice theoretical 
perspective? And what are the possible outcomes and benefits for sustainability? 
 How can we predict or anticipate the outcomes of intervening in practices if they are 
inherently dynamic and uncontrollable? 
Reading between the lines, these questions reflect a somewhat instrumental view of theory, and a 
rather narrow interpretation of policy relevance. Theories are expected to guide interventions,  it 
is assumed that some theories might have ‘better’ outcomes (for sustainability) than others and  
advocates of one theoretical perspective are therefore pitted against those in favour of a different 
approach. In all cases some value is placed on the ability to predict and anticipate, and in all cases 
the questions refer to ‘we’ – the presumed agents of intervention. 
Rather than being sucked into such a discussion, I want to turn the topic around. Instead of 
explaining why climate change policy should take practice theory seriously and detailing what that 
might involve, I suggest that a more interesting and perhaps more useful strategy is to show how 
climate change policy is in any case embroiled in the persistence and transformation of what 
people do. In the rest of the chapter I explore the relevance and potential of such an approach 
with reference to UK climate change policy. This is an illustrative exercise, not a comprehensive or 
exhaustive one, and many of the issues discussed below would apply to climate change policy in 
other countries, and to other areas of public policy. 
A first and obvious point to make is that in the UK, as elsewhere, climate change policy is evidently 
not informed by theories of social practice; nor is there any ambition to change what people do. 
As UK government documents repeatedly underline, the goal is to reduce carbon emissions 
without changing current standards of living. More precisely, the government’s strategy depends 
on developing and adopting a range of technologies and infrastructures (for example, district 
heating, electric vehicles, smart grids) thought capable of sustaining present ways of life but with 
much lower carbon emissions than at present. It is true that the success of such approaches 
depends on consumers’ willingness to substitute lower carbon technologies for those they use 
today and that these behavioural modifications are required in order to preserve the status quo. 
So what are the practice-related implications of policies that are designed to achieve carbon 
targets without significantly modifying the range of practices on which current standards of living 
depend? 
One way of finding out is to review a selection of policy documents – the UK Carbon Plan (H.M. 
Government 2011) and supporting material, including Pathways to 2050 (Department of Energy 
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and Climate Change [DECC] 2010), with the aim of articulating the templates of present and future 
practice that they reproduce and carry. I use some of this material in developing three related 
observations. The first is that all interventions, including those designed to maintain present 
standards of living, are of consequence for the emergence, persistence and disappearance of 
different practices. The second is that technological innovations depend on innovations in 
practice. By way of example, I focus on the plan to introduce ultra low emission vehicles (ULEV) 
and electric or hybrid electric cars. Swapping UHEVs (ultra high emission vehicles – i.e. ‘normal’ 
petrol-fuelled cars) for ULEVs is presented as a matter of substitution, but as I explain, this can 
only occur through some kind of transition in practice. Third, I suggest that climate change policy is 
uniquely sensitive to the rhythms of social practice of which daily life is made – a point I develop 
with reference to the prospect of introducing ‘smarter’ methods of balancing electricity supply 
and demand in real time. 
These exercises demonstrate the relevance and importance of concepts and theories of practice 
not as rivals to incumbent models of behavioural/technological change, but as key resources in a 
more significant debate about how policy has effect, and about what it might mean to live in a 
very much lower carbon society. Having deliberately resisted the invitation to show how practice 
theory might be mobilised within policy (to inform methods of intervention, analysis, prediction or 
evaluation), I conclude with some rather more general remarks on the role of social theory in 
climate change and other kinds of policy. 
The UK’s Carbon Plan 
In 2011 the UK government set out a plan for halving ‘greenhouse gas emissions, on 1990 levels, 
by the mid-2020s’ (H.M. Government 2011: 1) and for putting the UK on course to meet the target 
of an 80% reduction by 2050. The plan is extremely clear about what needs to be done. To quote: 
Energy efficiency will have to increase dramatically across all sectors. The oil and gas used to drive 
cars, heat buildings and power industry will, in large part, need to be replaced by electricity, 
sustainable bioenergy, or hydrogen. Electricity will need to be decarbonised through renewable and 
nuclear power, and the use of carbon capture and storage (CCS). The electricity grid will be larger and 
smarter at balancing demand and supply. (H.M. Government 2011: 4) 
It is plain that this package of measures has been designed, from the start, to have little or no 
impact on present standards of living. Crucially, the ‘plan shows that the UK can move to a 
sustainable low carbon economy without sacrificing living standards, but by investing in new cars, 
power stations and buildings’ (H.M. Government 2011: 12). Although obvious, it is important to 
notice that the prospect of meeting emissions targets by changing or challenging everyday 
practice is ruled out of court. Instead, present ways of life constitute a stable benchmark around 
which future supply systems are to be designed. 
Given that the problem is framed in these terms, the way forward depends on the rapid 
development and adoption of technologies that reduce the need for energy (efficiency measures), 
that help decarbonise the electricity system and then increase reliance on electric power. Whilst 
this might look like a thoroughly technocratic vision, the Carbon Plan recognises that major 
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reductions in ‘per capita energy demand’ will only occur if people embrace ‘low carbon behaviour 
changes and smart new technologies such as heating controls’ and if they recognise ‘the financial 
benefits of taking up energy efficiency opportunities’ (H.M. Government 2011: 17). In other words, 
consumers will have to adopt a range of new technologies if the plan is to succeed and if standards 
of living are to be maintained. Proposed means of delivering the necessary changes in behaviour 
are consistent with the government’s wider commitment to ‘encourage, support and enable 
people to make better choices for themselves’ (H.M. Government 2010: 8), and with a reliance on 
economic and psychological models of human action. 
In conceptualising the climate change problem as one that can be solved through technological 
innovation and diffusion the Carbon Plan bypasses the issue of whether present standards of living 
could or should be called into question. Given that such standards are positioned outside the 
frame of policy and debate, the scope of the behaviour which climate change policy seeks to 
change is correspondingly limited. The central behavioural challenges consequently boil down to 
those of persuading people to do things like install insulation, lower the thermostat by one or two 
degrees, purchase electric vehicles, sign up for district heating schemes and accept an influx of 
heat pumps. In effect, it is at these few points that consumers are thought capable of facilitating 
or confounding the government’s strategy. That said, it would be wrong to conclude that the Plan 
has no broader vision of what life might be like in a lower carbon society, or that it has no bearing 
on the ongoing trajectories of social practice. As described below, climate change policy 
reproduces and perpetuates a distinctive – and some might argue, a distinctively resource 
intensive – vision of daily life. Brief discussion of DECC’s Pathways to 2050 provides some insight 
into how this works. 
Reproducing current practice: Pathways to 2050 
The Department of Energy and Climate Change has produced a range of models, reports and 
policy documents in support of the Carbon Plan. Pathways to 2050 is one of the more important of 
these in that it compares various routes through which carbon targets might be achieved. In the 
context of the present discussion it is instructive to review these scenarios and identify working 
assumptions about how, and how widely, ‘demand’, and the practices on which it depends, might 
vary. The six scenarios outlined in the report represent a range of possibilities. The Pathways 
document does not consider whether any one scenario is more likely than another, but by 
implication all are plausible. 
All scenarios suppose that over the next 40 years the population will grow by 25%, the number of 
households by 50% and GDP by almost 200% (DECC 2010: 34). Each scenario then represents a 
different set of assumptions both about the carbon intensity of energy supply and about the 
energy demand associated with lighting and appliances, transport, industry and heating and 
cooling. Based on these analyses, estimates of the total energy consumed in 2050 range from 10% 
above to 45% below that used in 2007. 
Because the scenarios are organised around sectors (e.g. lighting and appliances; heating and 
cooling etc), it is rarely possible to distinguish between specific visions of the various practices that 
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are lumped together. For example, while estimates of the potential demand for domestic hot 
water range from a 50% increase through to a 50% decrease compared to 2007, there is no 
indication as to whether this relates to habits of laundry, to personal bathing or a combination of 
the two. Instead, explanations of a potential increase simply assume that economic growth will 
lead ‘to an increased use of hot water, and a greater number of hot water using appliances’ (DECC 
2010: 99). There is no clue as to what these appliances might be, how this extra hot water might 
actually be used, or why hot water consumption and economic growth should be so closely 
aligned. Meanwhile, assessments of the potential for reducing hot water consumption focus on 
the scope for eliminating waste and promoting efficiency, but not on what this means for the 
conduct of different hot-water-dependent practices. In this context, a 50% decrease in hot water 
consumption is thus ‘thought to be the limit that could be achieved with greater consumer 
awareness of hot water efficiency, and more water efficient fittings’ (DECC 2010: 102) and, by 
implication, without modifying normal practice. 
Somewhat different reasoning is evident in relation to domestic space heating and cooling. Again 
the Pathways report compares four possible levels of demand, each associated with either an 
increase or a decrease in heating compared to the winter average of 17.5ºC in 2007.1 The least 
energy consuming level supposes an average temperature of 16ºC (on the grounds that this is the 
minimum to keep people safe). At the other end of the scale, the most energy consuming level 
supposes 20ºC, on the grounds that heating is not required beyond this point. Representations of 
cooling provide further insight into the concepts of comfort around which the analyses are 
organised. The text which explains why the most energy consuming possibility supposes 100% 
domestic air conditioning runs as follows: ‘it is assumed that every household in the UK has air 
conditioning by 2050, in response to increased wealth’ (DECC 2010: 99), and further that cooling is 
used to keep temperatures at or below 23.5ºC. Such a statement implies and in a sense legitimises 
the conclusion that there is a latent ‘need’ for cooling that is currently thwarted by cost. In these 
ways the Pathways document reproduces a fairly narrow interpretation of what indoor climates 
might be like, now and in the future. 
With hot water, and with heating and cooling, the basic picture is one in which the range of 
plausible scenarios is limited by a tacit understanding of the bounds of normal practice, and in 
which there is a sense that within these limits people use more energy (e.g. for hot water, or air 
conditioning) when they can afford it. Other areas of energy demand and of daily life appear to be 
much less well defined. There has been a six-fold increase in consumer electronics since the 1970s 
(DECC 2010: 49), and technologies and practices of leisure and home entertainment continue to 
co-evolve, generating new ways of using electricity and of spending time. In theory, scenario 
methods could be used to represent alternative trajectories, but in specifying possible levels of 
change, Pathways to 2050 makes no mention of how consumer electronic-dependent practices 
might develop. Instead, estimates of future demand reflect different assumptions about the 
technical efficiency of already known devices and appliances. The least energy consuming 
possibility is consequently based on the assumption that when ‘replacing our consumer 
                                                          
1
 The four levels also make different assumptions about the uptake of insulation and draft proofing. 
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electronics and home computing products, we could adopt only the best practice products until 
2050’ (DECC 2010: 55). 
In characterising scenarios with reference to technologies and sectors (heating, appliances, 
lighting etc), Pathways to 2050 focuses on the material infrastructure, but not on the range of 
practices that are thereby enabled. Because this method precludes any serious consideration of 
how heating, laundering or watching TV are currently configured or how they might evolve, the 
analysis leads to what becomes an inevitable conclusion: that ‘Electricity supply needs to be 
decarbonised, while supply may need to double’ (DECC 2010: 34). This finding, which is in part a 
consequence of how the problem has been framed, is of huge significance for the electricity 
industry and for nuclear power in particular. 
In supporting some kinds of investment and not others, documents like Pathways to 2050 sustain 
a web of interconnected practices that is so taken for granted that it never figures as a topic in its 
own right. Instead, infrastructures and lower carbon systems of provision are designed to enable 
the ongoing reproduction of these (and not other) ways of life.  
The Carbon Plan and related documents, including Pathways to 2050, are organised around the 
working assumption that what people do and how they live their lives will stay largely the same 
over the next forty years or so. However, as discussed in the next section, the strategies that 
follow require, and may also generate quite significant change in the patterns and practices of 
daily life.  
Implications for future practice: Decarbonising electricity 
The UK’s Carbon Plan concludes that a lower carbon future depends on increasing energy 
efficiency, decarbonising energy supply and introducing ‘new cars, power stations and buildings’. 
This is no small task, and the Carbon Plan recognises that the ‘scale of investment required in the 
electricity network is unprecedented’ if the government is to ensure that the grid is ‘able to 
deliver’ (H.M. Government 2011: 82) – here meaning able to deliver the power required to 
maintain the status quo. 
The question is whether such infrastructure developments are themselves important ‘in practice’ 
and hence in sustaining or challenging existing standards of living. As discussed below, practices 
and infrastructures connect, and with electricity in particular, supply and demand are closely 
interwoven. Insofar as cars and buildings are implicated in what people do, low carbon policies are 
likely to have unintended consequences for the range of practices enacted in society, for how 
these change and for how complexes and bundles of practice form. At this point it makes sense to 
take a closer look at exactly what the Carbon Plan involves. 
In many respects the UK’s Carbon Plan is a plan for electricity. This is made clear in the executive 
summary, which emphasises the need to replace oil and gas with decarbonised electricity, and to 
develop a larger electricity grid that is ‘smarter at balancing demand and supply’ (H.M. 
Government 2011: 4). 
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In thinking about how this Plan might work in (and for) practice it is useful to reflect on the 
relation between the provision of electric power and the organisation and conduct of daily life. 
Those who have studied the early days of the electricity industry describe a closely coupled 
process in which power supplies and electricity-dependent practices developed in tandem (Forty 
1986; Hughes 1993 [1983]). Power companies actively promoted innovations in technology 
(cookers, fridges, toasters, vacuum cleaners) and hence in cooking and cleaning, in order to level 
peaks in demand associated with the other primary uses, which were initially transport (trams) 
and lighting. The details are different today, but two basic features remain. First, providing and 
consuming electric power depends on an interconnected network of technologies (kettles, power 
sockets, distribution systems, power stations, electric vehicles, distributed generation, district 
heating systems, industrial demand etc) and institutions (families, utilities, employers etc). Second, 
because supply and demand have to be matched in real time, the daily and seasonal performance 
of practices that underpin demand is absolutely crucial. In this respect, the provision of electric 
power is closely related both to the reproduction of individual practices and to how complexes 
and bundles of practice are sequenced, synchronised and scheduled during the day and over the 
year. 
Let us now turn back to the Carbon Plan, and to the features of the decarbonised electricity 
system that is envisaged. To quote: 
In electricity, the three parts to our portfolio are renewable power, nuclear power, and coal- and gas-
fired power stations fitted with carbon capture and storage. In transport, ultra-low emission vehicles 
including fully electric, plug-in hybrid, and fuel cell powered cars are being developed. In buildings, 
the technologies will include air- or ground-source heat pumps, and using heat from power stations. 
Both of these are solutions proven by their use in other countries. (H.M. Government 2011: 5) 
The idea that cars will be powered by decarbonised electricity rather than oil is an integral part of 
this scheme. Some commentators contend that if this vision of substitution is to come true, pure 
and hybrid electric vehicles will have to match the performance of ‘proper’ petrol-driven cars. 
According to a recent report by the Energy Technologies Institute, this means that they should be 
capable of making a two-hour journey on a motorway on a cold winter night, with lights and 
heating system on full blast (Energy Technologies Institute 2013: 36). This working understanding 
of ‘a car’ is entwined with related understandings of driving, journeys and destinations. Strategies 
which reproduce ‘the car’ – so defined – help keep these other understandings in place. 
This is not the only possible interpretation either of ‘a car’, or of motorised mobility. Rather than 
mimicking the capabilities of a standard car, another possibility is to develop ULEVs that are more 
limited in range but that might have a place in relation to specific sets of practices, places and 
destinations. It is already the case that cars come in different shapes and sizes and that newer 
models tend to be used for longer journeys than older ones. Actively developing a more 
differentiated system and promoting a wider range of more and less ‘capable’ ULEVs would likely 
have some impact on the spatial and temporal organisation of daily life. 
More immediately, the widespread adoption of ULEVs depends on tinkering with the micro 
scheduling of daily activities – this is so in that fuelling/charging an electric vehicle takes longer 
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than the minute or two that it takes to fill up at a pump. The precise scheduling of ‘driving’ and 
‘charging’ is not something that can be modified in isolation since it relates to the social 
synchronisation of the many other practices in which people are engaged: in Lefebvre’s (2004) 
terms, it is bound up with the rhythm of society as a whole. 
Whatever form it takes, the project of electrifying mobility is likely to have direct and indirect 
implications for many social practices, and for related patterns of spatial order and societal 
synchronisation. Equally importantly, the potential for introducing such arrangements, and 
thereby realising policy ambitions, depends on whether and how existing complexes of practice 
might be reconfigured in response. This partly depends on the parallel future (or not) of current 
arrangements including those that support and sustain the standard petrol-driven car, along with 
the garages, petrol stations, supply networks and related infrastructures that keep this system in 
place. In short, it is impossible to consider the positioning and role of ULEVs in isolation: how they 
relate to UHEVs, and to other forms of mobility and to the reproduction of practices in space and 
time, is absolutely crucial. 
Since policy making is not informed by an understanding of social practices and how they change, 
these issues are not topics of analysis and debate. Instead, attention focuses on acquisition (how 
to persuade people to buy electric cars) rather than use, and on overcoming features (barriers) 
that make electric vehicles either ‘more than’ or ‘less than’ a ‘normal’ car – all of which is in 
keeping with the dominant philosophy of technological substitution. As summarised in the Carbon 
Plan: 
Barriers to ULEV uptake include costs of ownership including insurance; consumer acceptability, for 
example over the range of battery electric vehicles, or payload requirements for vans; availability, 
and cost of natural resources such as lithium and rare earth metals; and the appropriate 
infrastructure for different ULEV technologies, providing adequate re-charging access and speed. Our 
strategy is designed to tackle these barriers as detailed at paragraph 2.92. Nevertheless uncertainties 
around when these barriers will come down could mean mass ULEV uptake is delayed into the 2030s. 
(H.M. Government 2011: 53) 
This way of framing the problem overlooks the point that ‘uptake’ is an active and creative process 
of embedding, modifying and adapting existing routines and patterns of daily life (Silverstone 
1993). More than that, it is a process in which the contours of existing social practices are 
redefined, and through which new ways of living – even new standards of living – emerge. In 
sticking firm to a model of technological substitution and consumer choice the Carbon Plan is blind 
to the more systemic, more collective and endlessly dynamic features of social practice on which 
its own success and failure arguably depends. 
Much the same applies to the Carbon Plan’s ambition to decarbonise electricity supply. 
Rhythms of social practice and of energy supply 
According to the Carbon Plan, decarbonising electricity supply means greater reliance on nuclear 
power and on renewables, especially wind. This, together with the proposal to use more 
(decarbonised) electricity, and to do so for a greater range of practices, means that it will be 
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increasingly difficult to keep electricity supply and demand in balance. A recent report on demand 
side response (DSR) in the domestic sector consequently concludes that: 
The importance of DSR is likely to increase as the UK moves to a low-carbon economy. Low-carbon 
demand-side technologies such as electric vehicles and electric heat pumps may increase both the 
size of daily peaks in demand and the proportion of demand that can be flexible. At the same time, 
the need for demand side flexibility is likely to increase as more electricity generation comes from 
low-carbon technologies, which often have more variable and less predictable output. (Frontier 
Economics and Sustainability First 2012: 3) 
Current thinking is that these challenges can be handled through ‘smarter’ management of the 
grid, and of when electricity is consumed within homes and businesses. The ‘smart meter’ is a 
critical part of this vision, along with the prospect of tariffs that encourage off-peak demand 
(Strengers 2013). Such schemes suppose that consumers can and will respond to price ‘signals’, 
and that they are both willing and able to modify the timing of what they do. 
This overlooks the extent to which daily rhythms are socially, and not individually, orchestrated 
(Zerubavel 1979; Southerton 2003). In some cases, and perhaps in many, the temporal ordering of 
the day is such that there is little or no scope for reorganising the details of what happens when. 
In these situations, smart metering and/or real time pricing is of no consequence for the timing of 
social practices, or of the energy demands associated with these practices.  
Understanding the potential for rescheduling the timing of energy demand arguably depends on 
much better understanding of the social ordering and orchestration of daily life, and of how this is 
shaped by a raft of non-energy policies, including those that have to do with working and opening 
hours, or with institutional arrangements of one kind or another. To give a simple example, the 
daily load profile of electricity demand demonstrates the persistent significance of standardised 
working hours – a patterning that generates spikes and peaks of demand when people return 
home, and in the morning before they set off for work. This diurnal rhythm is a consequence of 
the sequential ordering of social practices that is in part held in place by a variety of institutional 
arrangements, some of which are rooted in, and reproduced through different types and forms of 
public policy. Modifying such arrangements on any scale evidently calls for more than a ‘thin’ 
account of behavioural options. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, understanding how 
these and other rhythms work is crucial if policy makers are to avoid overestimating the temporal 
flexibility of demand, and of consequently compromising the project of decarbonising supply. 
Since decarbonising supply increases the time-sensitivity of the electricity system as a whole, 
systems of provision are more closely coupled to the dynamics and timings of practice – to who 
does what, where and when – than ever before. Ironically this means that the Carbon Plan and the 
policies that follow are uniquely sensitive to the spatial and temporal organisation of social 
practice. 
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Linking climate change policy and practice 
At the start of this chapter I explained my reluctance to get drawn into a debate about the relative 
merits of practice-based, as opposed to behavioural, methods of persuading people to adopt and 
use low-carbon technologies. One of the difficulties of engaging in such discussions is that any 
response perpetuates an already constricted agenda. Rather than fitting concepts of practice into 
a slot pre-defined by questions of behaviour change, and rather than going along with a view of 
social theory as something that should translate, quite directly, into guidance for action and 
frameworks or ‘toolkits’ for intervention, I have sought to show how climate change policy plays 
out within and through the dynamics of social practice. 
At this point it is useful to take stock of what this exercise has revealed. Does it help address the 
questions around which this book is organised, and is it of any relevance to those involved in 
developing climate change, or any other form of public policy? 
In the UK, as elsewhere, methods of estimating future energy demand define and reproduce 
templates and ranges of ‘normal’ practice. These visions and assumptions are real in their effects, 
having direct impact on infrastructure investment and strategies of supply. In this context, an 
understanding of how social practices are reproduced is of value in highlighting the extent to 
which policy has a hand in perpetuating the conditions on which certain ways of life, or sets of 
practices, depend. This is especially significant in that policy makers frequently deny any such 
responsibility, instead favouring models of behaviour, or of technological adoption, in which 
citizens and consumers figure as the primary agents of change. The conclusion that policy is 
unavoidably implicated in the dynamics of social practice may not be particularly welcome, 
especially not in situations in which the political ambition is to help people make better choices for 
themselves. However, it does have some bearing on the first question that the editors pose: that 
is, ‘Can we intervene in, or govern, social life from a social practice theoretical perspective?’ On 
this point the answer is unquestionably ‘yes’: like it or not, all interventions (including non 
interventions!) constitute interventions in practice. 
As illustrated above, thinking through the practice-related implications of climate change policy 
helps identify some of the blind spots that arise from current understandings of technological 
substitution and adoption and of the behavioural changes that this entails. I have suggested that 
such blind spots (for example, the failure to understand how material infrastructures and 
complexes of social practice constitute each other) obscure precisely those features of social 
practice that matter for the likely realisation, or not, of policy ambitions like those of introducing 
ULEVs. The conclusion that climate change policies are situated in a world already shaped by past 
interventions and that technological ‘solutions’ are thoroughly enmeshed in ongoing bundles and 
complexes of practice makes sense, but is it of any policy relevance? 
The response is complicated in that the blind spots which understandings of social practice reveal 
do not arise by accident – they are a necessary and perhaps inevitable outcome of the policy 
process and of the behavioural/technocratic theories and models on which that process depends. 
Failure to fully engage with the point that interventions are positioned within and between 
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existing social practices is consequently something to be expected, and is not something that is 
likely to be overcome or ‘corrected’ anytime soon. 
For the editors and readers of this book, this points to a related question: would a ‘social practice 
theoretical perspective’ have any distinctive benefits and outcomes for sustainability? In response 
it is plausible to suggest that an understanding of how practices co-evolve might underpin types of 
intervention that get to the heart of the problem and that are therefore more effective than other 
possible methods. For example, rather than promoting electric vehicles it might make better sense 
to identify and actively promote sets of practices into which electric mobility might fit. Similarly, 
rather than developing and promoting smart meters, the challenges of balancing energy supply 
and demand could be addressed at a societal scale by exploiting the many ways in which public 
policy (education, employment, etc) has a bearing on daily and seasonal rhythms of practice and 
hence the timing of demand. The difficulty here is that strategies like this would call for styles of 
cross-sectoral policy making, and for forms of intervention that go well beyond the bounds of 
legitimate policy involvement, as presently defined. This leads to a rather complicated conclusion: 
taking social practices as the central topic of policy making and analysis probably does have 
distinctive benefits. However, these benefits are unlikely to be realised because of the way in 
which climate change policy is currently organised. 
The editors’ final question – how can we predict or anticipate the outcomes of intervening in 
practices if they are inherently dynamic and uncontrollable? – is much easier to answer. From a 
practice theory point of view, it is impossible to predict how new and existing practices might 
develop. This does not mean that there is no point in seeking to intervene. As indicated above, the 
chances of effective intervention are probably higher if such interventions are grounded in some 
general understanding of how practices change, but there are absolutely no guarantees of success. 
This raises a further challenge: if climate change policy is to be informed by practice theory, it will 
be necessary to abandon certain illusions of agency, and related expectations of predictability, 
cause, impact and effect (Rip 2006). Again, this is an unlikely prospect. 
In conclusion, the policy relevance of practice theory remains ambivalent. On the one hand, it is 
only by focusing on the lives and trajectories of social practices, and on the formation and 
dissolution of bundles and complexes of practice, that we can ‘see’ and begin to conceptualise the 
ways in which low-carbon policies, and all the other policies that have an impact on the carbon 
intensity of what people do, are positioned within the constantly changing fabric of daily life. On 
the other hand, it is impossible to identify ways of using or mobilising the observations and 
insights that follow within the policy making process as it is currently configured. 
Although practice-theoretical concepts are unlikely to have much of a home within climate change 
policy, they are nonetheless useful in showing how favoured interventions relate to the ongoing 
reproduction and transformation of daily life. In arguing that this is an important contribution in its 
own right, I am at the same time arguing for a more subtle understanding of the relation between 
social theory and public policy. It is tempting to suppose that relevant social science is that which 
delivers insights that feed and fuel current policy agendas. This is not always so. In this chapter I 
have suggested that practice theories are of value (but not instant relevance) precisely because 
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they are paradigmatically at odds with the models of behaviour change and technological 
innovation on which at much climate change policy depends. To argue otherwise, and to persist 
with the project of moulding practice theory into some policy-amenable form, is to miss the point, 
and to misunderstand what makes practice theories distinctive, and distinctively valuable. 
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